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I THE ORIGINS OF THE BIREGIONAL RELATIONS. 
THE ROOTS OF A MULTIFACETED RELATIONSHIP 
Latin America must undoubtedly be considered as a place of contrasts. Racial, geo-
graphic and social differences make it impossible to elaborate a single picture for the 
whole region. Geographically, the fertile pastures in Argentina’s Pampas contrast 
sharply with the arid planes in the Puna, the green opulence of the Amazon or the iso-
lated Andean heights. Demographically, Latin Americans can be defined as a mixture 
of three racial groups: white Europeans, native Indians and black Africans (see 
Skidmore/Smith 1997). However, this mixture is not evenly distributed; the native Gua-
temalans could hardly be compared with the Italian/Spanish Argentinean population. 
Socially, Latin America comprises a wide variety of conditions and situations. On aver-
age, the countries of the region suffer from the greatest income inequality in the world, 
and many of the region’s countries feature some of the widest income gaps in the 
world: in Brazil and Guatemala, almost 50% of the national income is concentrated in 
the top 10% of the population (IDB 1999a). Such a variety of situations renders an 
analysis of Latin America difficult, subjecting it to the initial assumptions of the re-
searcher. The many stereotypes of Latin America and Latin Americans further compli-
cate attempts to analyse the region and its biregional relations - even with the applica-
tion of scientific method. 
The complexity resulting from the existence of many contrasting realities is also the 
source of ambivalence. Throughout Latin America’s history, prosperity and decadence, 
health and poverty, dependence and independence, change and rigidity, peacefulness 
and struggle have been equally mixed. Ambivalence has been typical not only of Latin 
America’s own evolution; it has also marked the development of its relations with other 
regions, most specifically with Europe. The history of Latin American- European rela-
tions clearly reflects this ambivalence. The historical importance of European Un-
ion- Latin American relations is certainly widely accepted. However, when defining the 
concrete dimensions of this importance, the difficulties emerge. Historical analyses 
often remain at an excessively casual level, emphasising the contrasts in development 
without examining the transformation of the biregional relations over time. Taking into 
account the ambivalence in Latin America’s development, an analysis of some particu-
lar aspects of the historical biregional relations could be helpful to our understanding of 
the current situation, or at least to reinterpreting some of the recent developments in 
the biregional ties. Given that past experiences condition present expectations, and 
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without being too deterministic, shedding light on Latin America’s historical experi-
ences with Europe will enable us to analyse Latin America’s prospects in biregional 
relations. 
 
1 Conquest and colonisation: the European heritage for the 
contemporary age 
The arrival of Spain and Portugal in Latin America signalled the beginning of the conti-
nent’s Europeanisation process, which for Latin Americans has two different and op-
posite meanings: one of constructing a European order in the New World, and another 
of destroying the native Indian order. The arrival of Europeans in Latin America has 
thus been considered both as an encounter of civilisations and as an invasion, with 
several intermediate positions between both extremes. These two contrasting visions 
have permeated Latin America’s interpretation of its modern and contemporary history 
since the very time of colonisation, and they subtly influence the nature of its relation 
with the mother continent. 
With Spain’s arrival in Latin America in 1492 (the controversial ”discovery”), the region 
began the continuous, albeit heterogeneous, development of its links with Europe and 
with the world. This moment signalled for the continent the end of an era of isolation and 
the beginning of its political and economic inclusion in the world system. The main fea-
ture of this inclusion was, paradoxically, its involuntary nature. Initially, Latin America saw 
the European presence as a constraint that forced the region into an involuntary social, 
economic and political adaptation. By the time of the Spanish arrival in Latin America, the 
region had its own economic, political and social institutions, which in some cases (the 
Aztecs and Incas, for example) were the bases of vast, flourishing and powerful empires. 
As the conquest of the new territories implied the imposition of the Iberian order, those 
local forms of organisation were condemned to perish. Hernán Cortés in Mexico, Pedro 
de Alvarado in Central America, Francisco Pizarro in Peru and Pedro de Mendoza in Ar-
gentina were some of the adventurers and ”men of the Crown” responsible for the impo-
sition of the European flag and, more importantly, institutions on the new continent. The 
establishment of European economic, social and political structures was almost com-
pleted in less than a century (between 1492 and 1590). This is a short period of time 
considering the dimensions of the new territories and the level of development of the de-
feated empires. 
It was not Europe in general but rather Spain and Portugal, that is, the Iberians, who 
were responsible for the first phase of Latin America’s incorporation into the modern 
world. That Latin America was colonised by Spain and Portugal and not by England or 
Holland was the key factor for defining the region’s institutions and culture. The Span-
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ish and Portuguese established in Latin America a colonial administration which corre-
sponded to their respective administrations in Europe at that time. 
In 1492, the Iberian peninsula achieved the final expulsion of the Moors. Spain and 
Portugal developed a special type of political, economic and social order during this 
period. During the centuries before the expulsion of the Moors, the peninsula remained 
divided into many small and weak kingdoms, with a rigid feudal organisation and very 
militarised societies. Catholicism was very strong and deep-rooted, marking almost 
every dimension of social life. Consequently, the reconquest of the peninsula was con-
sidered a political as well as a religious imperative. Furthermore, Iberian Catholicism, 
which inspired a scholastic tradition, allowed virtually no social mobility, thus reinforc-
ing the social and political hierarchies. Military courage, eagerness, religious fanati-
cism, social rigidity and despotic centralism were the main characteristics of the Ibe-
rian order by the time of the arrival in Latin America. 
Those characteristics of the Iberian order were fully reflected in the colonisation. The 
urge to conquer territories was a consequence of the long, turbulent struggle of the 
kings to expel the Muslim invaders. The conquerors came with the idea of establishing 
their own empires, formally subordinated to the mother country but in fact enjoying the 
freedom of limited control possibilities. In contrast to the systematic conquest of terri-
tory achieved during the Anglo-Saxon colonisation of North America, conquerors in 
Latin America were mostly driven by the desire for gold and other valuable metals, 
harboring little interest in land per se. This motivation helps to explain why the ca-
balgadas in Spanish territories and the bandeirantes in Portuguese ones were so 
widespread (see Rouquié 1987). Furthermore, the conquest was carried out under the 
Crown and the Cross. Conquest and evangelisation were two complementary facets of 
colonisation, and the natives' religious subordination became another way of reinforc-
ing the authority of the Iberian controlling power. Scholasticism, characteristic of Ibe-
rian Catholicism, rationally deduced the power of the Crown from God, thus helping to 
justify a political and social hierarchy and rejecting alternatives of change (Wiarda 
1995). Finally, the centralism was the natural consequence of an effort to maintain 
control over territories, since extension and distance to the colonial powers could 
threaten Spain's and Portugal's political authority. Centralism, particularly strong in the 
Spanish colonies, was a strategy to counterbalance the power of individual entrepre-
neurs, who were the main pillar of the Americas enterprise.  
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By the end of the XVI century, with the conquest almost completed, a European eco-
nomic, social and political colonial order was thus fully imposed on Latin America (see 
Bethell 1984). 
Political order 
After the leading role of private entrepreneurs and individual conquerors, the King was 
compelled to resume control of the Latin American adventure. The Crown retained in 
its hands the ultimate authority over the colonies by creating a set of institutions aimed 
at granting the application of the royal law in Latin America. This organisation was hi-
erarchically structured and functioned as a transmission system, where conflicts could 
always be referred to a higher level of authority. Below the King was the Council of the 
Indies, an institution located in Spain and charged with overall policy in the colonies. In 
Latin America, a viceroy, a King’s personal representative, whose decisions had the 
same weight as royal decisions, headed the administration. Audiencias, courts of ap-
peal with geographically limited jurisdiction, represented the judiciary. At the bottom of 
the hierarchy were the Cabildos, local institutions, usually controlled by the local elite, 
which retained some power of decision making despite the royal centralisation. A 
complicated labyrinth of edicts and decrees made changes in the political system al-
most impossible. Moreover, the whole political system contained a certain hypocrisy: 
laws were technically respected but not necessarily carried out. De facto judgement 
and particular local interests were given an important weight. The phrase ”reverencio 
pero no cumplo” (I obey but I do not comply) used by colonial officials receiving an 
order was a pragmatic answer to the occasionally unrealistic decisions of the King. 
Social order 
The social order imposed by the Iberians was characterised by both ethnic and class 
differences. Although the mixture of white and Indians or black people (whose pres-
ence was important in the Caribbean and Brazil) was not strange, a clear hierarchy 
was established according to ethnic origin. White people, comprising peninsulares 
born in the peninsula as well as American Spaniards (called criollos) born in the new 
territories, were at the top of the pyramid, holding the political and economic power in 
the colonies. Nevertheless, all administrative positions were reserved for peninsulares, 
which in the long term provoked profound resentment on the part of the Creoles. Peo-
ple of mixed blood occupied the intermediate level. Indians were at the bottom of the 
pyramid, subjugated to forced labour by the Spanish through different institutions such 
as repartimiento, encomienda and mita. Blacks were formally below the Indians, work-
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ing in plantaciones in Brazil or as artisans in some cities along the Peruvian coast. 
Alongside this racial stratification, class differences made the social system even more 
rigid: posts in the colonial bureaucracy could be bought, which in turn allowed some to 
improve their social situation. Participation in political power was soon seen as a 
method to acquire a better economic position. 
Economic order 
The colonies’ economic structure reflected mercantilist precepts, the economic theory 
prevailing in Spain and Portugal at the time. According to mercantilism, economic ac-
tivity should enhance the prestige and power of the State, measured on the basis of 
accumulation of gold and silver. Thus, the Crown’s efforts were first concentrated in 
monopolising the wealth discovered in Latin America. Mining was the main activity, 
while agriculture and manufacturing were discouraged, since production in Latin Amer-
ica would compete with that of the mother country. Because Indian labour was the 
principal foundation of mining, the availability of a sufficiently large work force, volun-
tary or not, was a key to guaranteeing economic dominance. Due to the catastrophic 
fall among the Indian population provoked by the conquest, the import of black slaves 
from Africa offset declines in the work force. Regarding trade, the colonial powers es-
tablished a strict monopoly and prevented the involvement of other European powers 
in the New World during the first centuries of colonisation. 
During the XVIIth century, after Latin America had become an important part of Euro-
pean global power, changes in Europe unleashed a series of transformations in the 
colonies. With the defeat of the Spanish fleet in 1588 began the slow decline of Spain 
and the rise of England, Holland and France in the European power scene. These 
emerging imperial powers looked for possibilities in the Americas (England occupied 
Jamaica, Barbados and St. Kitts, Holland Curaçao and France Martinique, Gua-
daloupe and Dominica), threatening the integrity of the Spanish trading system. For 
the colonies, Spain’s trade monopoly was a growing problem, as it hindered commerce 
with more dynamic and prosperous nations, such as England. In fact, trade took place 
in the form of smuggling, in spite of Spain's prohibitions, thereby increasing the interest 
of local elites in an open trade regime (see Bulmer Thomas 1994). The acquisition by 
the Bourbons of the Spanish Crown implied many changes for the colonies; however, 
the outcomes were not always the expected ones. The Bourbons launched some re-
forms aimed at centralising the colonial administration and making it more efficient. For 
the colonies, this was hardly acceptable after they had enjoyed de facto Hapsburg 
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flexibility. Dissatisfaction with Iberian dominance increased in Latin America, even 
though Europe still continued to represent the logical source of authority. 
 
2. Latin America’s struggle for independence 
The colonies' motivation to seek independence from Spain certainly resulted from the 
social, economic and political characteristics of the colonial order, but it did not auto-
matically translate into a fight for freedom. The first struggles were aimed at obtaining 
some flexibility in the colonial rule, especially in the area of trade. Revolts against 
Spain took place not as a single act but at different times and with different character-
istics, depending on the sub-region and the standing of its local authorities. The first 
revolts began in Alto Peru (today Bolivia and Peru) and Nueva Granada (now Colom-
bia, Venezuela and Ecuador) in 1809, followed by Buenos Aires in 1810 (nowadays 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay in the so-called Virreynato del Río de la Plata) and 
Nueva España (today Mexico and Central America). They were triggered by events in 
the Iberian Peninsula. The French occupation of Spain and Portugal that obliged 
Charles IV to abdicate and started a crisis of authority also served to trigger the Latin 
American revolts.  
The first movements did not aim at declaring independence from the colonial power, 
but rather adhered to Spanish rule and rejected French control. The majority of Cre-
oles did not immediately seize the opportunity to cut ties with Spain but sought to pre-
serve a relationship developed over three centuries. This attitude has been called by 
some Latin American historians ”the mask of Ferdinand VII”, and interpreted as a 
strategy to avoid a direct confrontation with the mother country while disguising the 
real intentions of the revolutionaries. However, this hypothesis should be analysed in 
the context of the socio-political situation in the colonies and the legacy of Spanish 
dominance. In the conservative, rigid and profoundly stratified Latin American society, 
revolutionary positions were an extreme option. Few intellectuals were convinced of 
the advantages of obtaining independence from Spain, and most people judged it con-
venient to remain loyal to the mother country. More autonomy, rather than independ-
ence, was the real aim of the first revolutionaries. 
These initial reactions changed as the situation in the peninsula deteriorated, and 
European influences other than that of Spain began to penetrate colonial society. By 
1800, many sons of Creole families had studied in and travelled through Europe, be-
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coming influenced by liberalism and learning to admire the French revolution and Eng-
lish political culture. Simón Bolivar, José de San Martín and Francisco de Miranda 
were educated in Europe and soon became familiar with the writings of Adam Smith 
and (VV). In many select circles in all big colonial cities, European revolutionary phi-
losophical works were regularly commented on and discussed. Progressively more 
supporters were gained for the cause of independence among the ranks of the Creole 
population. Supporters also increased as soon as the negative consequences for the 
natives of a counter-revolution became clear (events in the Río de la Plata after the 
British invasion, and later on in Chile and Mexico, showed that the return of the royal-
ists represented a threat to the Creoles’ wealth). 
A further reason for the Creoles to opt for the struggle for independence stemmed from 
the conservative traits in their political ideology. The revolts in Mexico (the Grito de 
Dolores) had shown the Creole elite the advantages of controlling the mobilisation of 
huge, exploited masses and the necessity of assuming the position as guardians of the 
social order. Indians and blacks could be mobilised for political purposes as long as 
they were tightly controlled. They were, consequently, the first ones sent to combat 
and the ones who suffered most casualties in the wars of independence. At times, as 
in Peru, fears of mass mobilisations made the local elites join the royalists. In cases 
such as Rio de la Plata, where external influences and interests in open trade were 
stronger, the elites agreed to use the popular support to their advantage. Many Cre-
oles in the colonies favoured authoritarian forms of government (usually under a presi-
dential system that allowed a high concentration of power in the executive) in order to 
guarantee domination by the elite. 
Although Latin America rejected the Spanish monarchy, many Creoles were not op-
posed to other kinds of European tutelage. For many patriots, Spain was in general 
seen as a decadent power with antiquated values that were in direct conflict with an 
enlightened ideology. Latin American elites embraced liberalism as an antidote to what 
they saw as the backwardness inherent in Spanish institutions and values. However, 
liberalism in Latin America soon assumed its own character. It was a particular version 
of the European model, and used as an instrument to maintain the existing social order 
rather than to introduce changes in the colonial structure (Vayssière 1999). England 
and France were highly admired; their benevolent support was seen by many Creoles 
as a desirable alternative to dependence on Spain, as well as a solution to the chaos 
of local governments. Furthermore, some initiatives were taken by Latin Americans to 
convince English representatives that they should assume formal responsibilities over 
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the former Spanish possessions (Zitat). Moreover, independence and monarchy went 
hand in hand: José de San Martin, the libertador of Chile and Peru, was a staunch 
monarchist, supporting even the idea of introducing an Indian monarchy. In the con-
crete constitutional design of the new nations, however, forces supporting a republican 
form of government outweighed those supporting alternatives. The U.S. constitution 
became the model for Latin Americans because the presidential system enabled the 
Latin American nations to strengthen the elites and the landowners, and thereby con-
solidate the position of the Church and the Army-the two political factors that would 
shape Latin American politics in the following years. 
The independence of Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was a different case. However, it 
also featured continuity with Europe. When Napoleon invaded Portugal, the Portu-
guese Court fled to Brazil, where they implemented an extensive modernisation pro-
gramme. King João VI opened Brazilian commerce with England, recruited French art 
specialists to modernise the country’s architecture, and tried to attract European immi-
grants in order to reduce the predominance of the local population. The son of João, 
Pedro, who stayed in Brazil as the Prince regent after the French troops were driven 
out of Portugal, was the leader of the independence movement. Finally, an independ-
ent monarchy headed by Don Pedro was established in Brazil. This relatively smooth 
acquisition of independence allowed Brazil to escape the problems of material destruc-
tion, political instability and the traumatic decision to oppose the mother country (see 
Skidmore/Smith 1997). 
The long period following the declarations of independence between 1820 and 1850 
was for most of Latin America one of lacklustre growth, internal conflicts and civil war. 
During this complicated phase, the attention of the new nations was mainly concen-
trated on three tasks: a) the establishment of national boundaries, b) the fight against 
centrifugal forces stemming from a federalist form of government, and c) the building 
of civilian institutions aimed at counterbalancing the increasing militarism and the rise 
of caudillos. The ideological influence of Europe, especially of France whose cultural 
and intellectual achievements inspired the Latin American elites, remained high. Eng-
lish liberalism had an equally important influence, principally on the constitutional de-
sign of the new republics. The particularities of the regional political situation resulted 
in a mix of militarism and liberalism, and, subsequently, the emergence of authoritarian 
liberalism (see Arnold 1999). The local elites openly recognised the importance of lib-
eral principles as the pillars of post-independence policies, but they also concluded 
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that the unstable political situation did not allow these principles to be applied in prac-
tice. The gap between the legal order and political practice prevailed. 
Latin America’s economic relationship with Europe at this time has been characterized 
as one of dependency. Although Latin America’s exports to Europe increased, they 
were principally primary products (nitrates from Chile, guano from Peru, coffee from 
Brazil, meat and leather from Argentina, and cacao from Mexico) and thus less valu-
able than the European imports. Industrial products from Western Europe, especially 
from England, ruined many small producers in Latin America. The liberal principles 
prevailing after the wars of independence (with a few exceptions, such as the Argen-
tine Confederation) kept the Latin American governments from protecting local produc-
tion. Positions taken towards Europe became divided between those who suffered 
from European imports and called for protectionism, and those who profited from free 
trade and promoted closer ties with the Old Continent. Latin American countries were 
also financially dependent on Europe. European firms, principally those in London, had 
provided funds for the expensive wars of independence. 
 
3. European industrialisation and Latin America's uncom-
pleted modernisation 
The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed a deepening of the ties between 
Latin America and Europe. This was facilitated by Europe’s industrialisation and the 
emergence of the Latin American nations from the chaos of the civil wars. The after-
math of independence was for the region a period of reconstruction and of uneven 
growth, led by the exports of primary products (see Cardoso/Helwege 1995). However, 
in the 1870s Latin American countries embarked on modernisation programmes, made 
possible by the local elites as necessary preparation for economic take-off. Continuity 
in socio-political conditions, enabled by the elites’ control over the masses, was a key 
factor in allowing the untroubled development of Europe-Latin American relations. 
European influence on Latin America operated through various channels: 
Trade 
After the economic situation became more stable, Latin America witnessed a growth in 
productivity, and subsequently an increase in extraregional trade. On the one hand, 
the rising demand in Western European countries for primary products and inputs for  
10 
industrial production made Latin America a suitable supplier. On the other hand, Latin 
America provided a market for European products, given its European-type consump-
tion patterns and Europe’s competitiveness in industrial products (see Bear 1985). 
Guano and, later, cotton and sugar from Peru, coffee from Brazil, meat and cereals 
from Argentina, nitrates from Chile and minerals from Mexico gave rise to a rapid in-
crease in the region’s trade with Europe. With Latin America’s concurrent modernisa-
tion, the composition of the region’s import base evolved from consumer goods, such 
as textiles, to machinery and fuels used in industry and the mechanisation of agricul-
ture (see Stein/Stein 1970). Nevertheless, the positive effects of the growing trade 
flows were offset by their negative impact on the region’s economic development: a 
decrease in European demand caused a decline in production in Latin America, which 
in turn led to financial crises.  
Immigration 
At the end of the nineteenth century, most Latin American countries initiated policies to 
attract European immigrants. Such policies were grounded not only in the need for a 
work force (as in Brazil) and efforts to inhabit national territories (as in Argentina) but 
also in the local elite’s perception of European migrants as helping to boost moderni-
sation and counterbalance the native populations. Facundo, a literary work of the for-
mer Argentine President Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, opened the discussion of the 
two alternatives: civilisation or barbarism. The former was identified with Europe and 
the latter with the natives, or gauchos. The book was a clear example of the local intel-
lectuals’ scorn of the native populations and of their profound admiration for (northern) 
European civilisation. The policies to attract Europeans included fully paid one-way 
tickets (Wiarda 1995). As a result, the demographics of some of the new republics 
changed dramatically. Between 1857 and 1930, Argentina’s net immigration (mostly 
from Italy and Spain) reached 3.5 million, or 30% of the population in 1914. Brazil re-
ceived 4.1 million immigrants between 1884 and 1939, mainly from Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal and Germany. In Uruguay, European immigrants represented 18% of the total 
population by 1908 (Rouquié 1987, Wiarda 1995). Immigrants also had a direct politi-
cal impact, as their socialist and anarchist ideas prompted labour in Latin America to 
organise. The founding of the Socialist Party in Argentina in 1895 was due to activism 
by European socialists. In Chile, European anarchists organised workers, becoming 
one of the most politically active groups by the beginning of the 20th century. In Mex-
ico, where the European immigrants were less numerous, a Greek, Rhodakanaty, dis-
seminated socialist ideas (Hart 1980).  
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Investment  
European foreign investment was the principal source of modernisation in most Latin 
American countries. Investment, especially from England, allowed to be renovated or 
built the infrastructure in the region. Britain was Latin America’s most important foreign 
investor throughout the nineteenth century, accounting for two-thirds of investment by 
1913 (Cardoso/Helwege 1995). Modernisation was principally accomplished in order to 
support the development of an export-oriented economy. Roads, docks, railroads and 
bridges were designed to transport produce towards the export hubs. Foreign invest-
ment in infrastructure shaped not only the physiognomy of Latin America’s transporta-
tion system, but determined the location of population centres (Baer 1985). Concen-
trated in export-related activities, foreign investment also reinforced the political sys-
tem, as local export sectors (that held economic and political power) shared an interest 
with foreign investors in the development of agriculture, mining and cattle farming. The 
role played by European investment was in some countries even larger than that of 
national investors. In Argentina from 1900 to 1929, 35% of the country’s total fixed 
investment came from abroad, with England in the first position, followed by France 
and Germany (Skidmore/Smith 1997:74). By the end of the nineteenth century, Euro-
pean investors had penetrated the major export activity in Chile by gaining ownership 
of two-thirds of Chile’s nitrate fields. In Brazil, telegraph, railroad and shipping indus-
tries were in the hands of British and American firms. Under the rule of Porfirio Díaz, 
Mexico as well attracted large numbers of U.S. and British investors (Rouquié 1987). 
Finance 
The links between the national banking systems and the gold standard created an-
other linkage between Latin American and European economies. Fluctuations in gold 
reserves provoked changes in the domestic money supply. Moreover, the need for 
finance to support modernisation policies and the apparent impossibility of mobilising 
sufficient amounts of internal resources pushed some governments into issuing bonds 
in order to attract foreign capital. Foreign investors received government subsidies in 
sectors like railroads (as in Brazil), as well as guarantees of profits on their invest-
ments. By the end of the nineteenth century, banking houses in London, Brussels and 
Paris were competing to provide loans to Latin America despite the domestic instability 
in the region. Since the Latin American governments’ ability to pay their debts de-
pended on export activities, changes in external demand or in international commodity 
prices could lead to defaults-which took place throughout the nineteenth century. Ar-
gentina and Brazil, for example, had economies vulnerable to international market fluc-
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tuations (see Marichal 1989). However, British capital continued to flow thanks to the 
development of cheaper oceanic transport, refrigeration, low-cost steel and new min-
ing techniques.  
Culture and consumption patterns 
Most Latin Americans from the upper classes openly expressed their admiration for 
European culture. France was seen as the highest civilisation, acquiring an extraordi-
nary importance for Latin American cultural life. The influence of the Old Continent was 
vivid in such domains as literature, education, the arts and fashion. Positivism and 
scientism, the two main streams of European philosophy at the end of the century, had 
a great impact on Latin American societies, especially in education and politics. 
Europe was the main point of reference for the Latin American nations in the arts, even 
though local expression mixed imported influences. The identification with European 
culture reached the point that many members of Latin American elites defined them-
selves as half-Europeans, imitating the European lifestyle (Vayssière 1999). European 
influence was particularly notable in consumption patterns, which in turn had direct 
consequences for local production. Elites preferred European imports to national 
goods, although quality differences were not marked in many areas. Imitation of Euro-
pean consumption patterns was of instrumental value in denoting high social standing. 
European influence was strong in Latin America by the end of the 19th century. A sub-
tle difference, however, distinguishes this influence from the one a century before: in-
stead of a passive reception of a colonial inheritance, there was now a conscious and 
active search for focused bilateral relations. However, Latin Americans differed over 
the forging of ties with the Old Continent: while those holding conservative positions 
emphasised the modernising benefits of the ties with Europe, others saw the moderni-
sation process propelled by the European presence as neo-colonialism. 
 
 
4. New hegemonies, dependence and populism in  
Latin America 
After World War I, the United States replaced Great Britain as the global leader, and 
Europe stagnated. The new international scenario affected European- Latin American 
relations. The inter-war period marked the end of strong European engagement in the 
13 
continent, and the emergence of the United States as the principal extraregional 
power; Europe’s decline is a key factor in explaining the increasing importance of the 
United States in Latin America (see Drekonya Kornat 1984).  
On the economic side, the United States became Latin America’s principal creditor, 
imposing new requirements for financial stability in the region. Latin Americans ac-
cepted the gold standard after World War I in order to facilitate foreign investment 
flows, which were still mainly of British origin (Díaz Fuentes 1998). However, the im-
pressive economic development of the United States boosted the expansion of U.S. 
investments abroad, threatening Europe’s position as Latin America’s foremost credi-
tor. While British investment in Latin America barely increased between 1913 and 
1929, U.S. investments in the region grew from 173 million to 2.3 billion dollars during 
that period, or to represent more than 50% of the British investments in the region 
(Cardoso/Helwege 1995:49). Also U.S. firms stepped up their activities in Latin Amer-
ica: the United Fruit Company, International Petroleum, and General Motors trans-
formed into giant corporations, becoming seen as more powerful than their host gov-
ernments in the region. U.S. ”dollar diplomacy” aimed at reducing European invest-
ments, especially in Central America, served as the economic counterpart of the in-
creasing U.S. political interest in Latin America. 
On the political level, the United States adopted an increasingly active Latin American 
policy in the 19th century. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine (which stipulated that any Euro-
pean intervention in Latin America would be considered a hostile act towards the 
United States) revealed U.S. interest in the region. However, the United States was 
chiefly concerned about the European presence in Central America and the Carib-
bean, paying less attention to the strong European presence in South America. With 
the discovery of gold in California, the U.S. expanded to the west and southwards: 
Texas was annexed in 1845, followed by California, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and 
Nevada in 1848. However, British capital continued to dominate in South America. But 
in the early twentieth century, the U.S. stepped up its activities in Latin America. 
Cuba’s war of independence (1895-1898), and subsequently the island’s becoming a 
U.S. protectorate, brought Spanish presence in the Americas to an end. Theodore 
Roosevelt’s 1903 corollary to the Monroe doctrine (which justified U.S. intervention in 
the Hemisphere) provided a stepping stone for U.S. military interventions in Central 
America and the Caribbean (Vayssière 1999), including in Panama in 1903, Nicaragua 
in 1911, Haiti in 1914 and the Dominican Republic in 1916. However, U.S. political 
influence remained limited in South America, and its efforts to build a Pan- American 
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movement were opposed by the most pro-European countries (Argentina and Uru-
guay, in particular). From the first Conference of American States in 1889 (Roger, 
1985) and during the first two decades of the twentieth century, Latin American coun-
tries voiced fears about U.S. imperialism in the region.  
The Great Depression and World War II prompted Latin American countries to indus-
trialise. The decline in international commodity prices limited Latin American govern-
ments’ access to foreign currency to purchase imports; governments were thus forced 
to substitute for imports through domestic means. The subsequent import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) policies found support in intellectual circles. The Economic Com-
mission for Latin America (ECLAC), particularly its director Raúl Prebisch, became 
fierce advocates of the new strategy. The main argument for the ISI was that the terms 
of trade of developing countries, whose exports are concentrated in primary products, 
were facing a secular decline; ISI strategies would protect infant industries, thereby 
boosting the accumulation of capital and developing national industries that would be 
internationally competitive (see Rosales 1988). Governments were to assume an ac-
tive role in implementing the strategy. Subsidies, credits, export facilities, high import 
tariffs, import quotas and exchange rate restrictions formed the core of the ISI policies 
(see Jaguaribe 1973).  
However, by the end of the 1950s, criticism of the ISI model increased, especially in 
intellectual circles. The bulk of the gross domestic product (more than 50% in most of 
the main Latin American countries) was generated by the State (Wiarda 1995), while 
private sector activities were weak. Although growth rates in some cases were quite 
impressive, external indebtedness remained high. National production was geared to 
meeting internal demand, and few productive activities were internationally competi-
tive. Exports were mainly composed of primary products. State bureaucracies, mean-
while, had become bloated and inefficient. The regional integration called for by CE-
PAL was impeded by the ISI strategies, and political obstacles impeded integration. 
The rise of populism in many Latin American countries, moreover, complicated efforts 
to correct the obvious deficiencies of the ISI (see Dornbusch/Edwards 1991). 
Notwithstanding the rather loose ties between Latin America and Europe during this 
period, the development strategy followed by most Latin American countries resem-
bled the European model. U.S. free market strategies were seldom adopted in Latin 
America prior to the 1970s, when the oil crises impeded the continuation of the state-
led industrialisation model in the region. Despite differences in types of government, 
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Latin American countries by and large followed the European definition of the role of 
the State. The conservative military government in Peru, the authoritarian albeit mod-
ernising government of Getulio Vargas in Brazil, the conservative military regime and 
populist government under Peron in Argentina, the populist caudillismo of Cárdenas in 
Mexico and the various populist governments in Chile held similar views of the State´s 
role in economic development. In some countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, the 
fascination with European development models ran particularly deep, with their gov-
ernments being openly sympathetic to the corporatist and fascist models in vogue in 
the Mediterranean countries. 
With American participation in World War II, the pressure for Latin American govern-
ments to break political links with Europe increased dramatically. Although the Latin 
American governments decided to be neutral in the European conflict at the 1939 Con-
ference of Panama, by the beginning of the 1940s their positions were already split. 
Central American and Caribbean countries declared war on the fascist powers in 1941, 
with Mexico, Brazil and Chile following. Argentina was the last nation to declare war, 
abandoning its neutrality only just before the end of the conflict. The Cold War, mean-
while, brought U.S. political, ideological, military and economic influence to Latin Amer-
ica: 
?? On the political level, the U.S. pressed for the establishment of a new Pan-
American organisation. The Organisation of American States (OAS), a regional 
body with permanent institutions and a secretariat in Washington, was created in 
April 1948. According to the principle of collective security harboured by the OAS, 
every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity, sovereignty or 
political independence of an American state would be considered an act of aggres-
sion against the other American states. OAS priorities also included co-operation 
on cultural issues and addressing regional social and economic problems. 
?? In the military sphere, several agreements were signed to support co-operation 
between armies in the Americas and to provide U.S. technical assistance for the 
military in Latin American countries. The School of the Americas, based in Pa-
nama, became the principal U.S. instruction centre for the Latin American military 
(Vayssière 1999:132); it trained more than 45,000 Latin American officials in its 30 
years of existence. The Rio Pact and the Chapultepec Act provided mutual de-
fence arrangements in case of an attack from outside the hemisphere. The imple-
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mentation of these agreements was, however, ambiguous: when Argentina went to 
war against Great Britain in 1982, the U.S. did not assist Argentina. 
?? On the ideological level, the Cold War was characterised by the fight against 
communism and the U.S. priority to prevent a ”second Cuba” in the region. Direct 
U.S. intervention in Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1970), Central America 
(1979) and Grenada (1983) aimed at avoiding the installation of supposed Marxist-
Leninist regimes. U.S. support for different national security institutions such as 
Escuela Superior de Guerra (ESG) in Brazil and Servicio Nacional de Inteligencia 
(SNI) in Chile can be considered complementary to the U.S. strategic interests  
(see Stepan 1988, Rouquié 1984). 
?? Paradoxically, and although the U.S. supported free market strategies, on the eco-
nomic level the U.S. based Ex-Im Bank provided financing for many state-led in-
dustrialisation projects in Latin America, including in Brazil and Argentina. The 
presence of U.S.-based firms in Latin America increased rapidly. The U.S. was a 
prominent player also in the area of development co-operation: Kennedy’s Alliance 
for Progress, launched in Punta del Este in 1961, promised 20 billion dollars for 
Latin America over the following 20 years, with Johnson setting the amount at 3 bil-
lion a year in 1967 (Vayssière 1999). 
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II LATIN AMERICA FROM THE 1980S TO THE 1990s: 
A NEW CONTEXT FOR BIREGIONAL LINKS 
1.  The 1980s in Latin America 
The debt crisis signalled a turning point for Latin America, especially in respect of de-
velopment strategy. The sudden interruption of external financing sources – provoked 
by the international reaction to the Mexican moratorium – made it difficult to continue 
with the import substitution strategy (ISI) that had been pursued until then. Due to the 
dependency of national production on imported supplies, the limited capacity of Latin 
American countries to import (because of the lack of foreign exchange) had a negative 
impact on domestic activity. The policy of protectionism and isolationism followed by 
Latin American states in the framework of import substitution could no longer be pur-
sued. However, the ill-feeling left by the liberalisation policies implemented by the mili-
tary governments in some Latin American countries during the 1970s (Car-
doso/Helwege 1995:181ff) meant it sometimes became difficult to re-orientate policy. 
In the 1980s, therefore, an internal debate raged in many Latin American countries on 
the convenience of opening the national economy to foreign capital vs. the importance 
of continuing with a model that sought to maintain the independence of national indus-
try. Although the debate was not always completely resolved, the policy orientation 
was modified. The conditionality of restructuring loans made by international financial 
institutions was a key external factor in reinforcing this new orientation of development 
strategies (see Burki/Edwards 1995, Aszkenazy 1988). 
Biregional relations must be examined within the framework of that strategic change. 
Since modification of the development strategy indirectly altered the foreign policy of 
Latin America in general, it also changed the pattern of relations with Europe in par-
ticular (Van Klaveren 1991). Not only did the (conscious) formulation of foreign policy 
change, but also the internal political and economic conditions in the region, thereby 
creating a different overall framework for biregional relations. Since World War II, Latin 
America’s foreign relations were conditioned by its inward-oriented development strat-
egy, which implied a policy of detachment from the world economy and the search for 
regional integration through protectionist policies. After the debt crisis, growing evi-
dence about the impossibility of continuing with this development strategy forced Latin 
America to re-define its development strategy. This dramatically changed Latin Amer-
ica’s physiognomy. The difficult but progressive replacement of an inward-oriented by 
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an outward-oriented development strategy led to a parallel reformulation of regional 
and subregional integration processes. Democratic consolidation also directly affected 
the fundamentals guiding the formulation of foreign policy. Biregional relations were 
affected, both positively and negatively, by changes in three areas: integration, internal 
political conditions, and debt management and economic policy.  
Integration processes were mainly initiated in the 1960s, but these stagnated in 
the 1970s after being criticised for their lack of concrete achievements and the obvious 
contradictions between the political integration discourse and the practice of protec-
tionism and mutual mistrust. By the beginning of the 1980s, the impression that inte-
gration schemes needed to be reformulated became widespread (see Chaparro 1991, 
Sunkel 1998). The Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI) replaced the 
Latin American Free Trade Association (Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comer-
cio o ALALC) in an effort to revitalise the integration idea. The Andean Group tried 
through the Protocol of Quito (1987) to overcome some of the contradictions of the 
process. Moreover, although the economic environment, affected by the debt crisis, 
was certainly not very promising, multilateralism flourished and many Partial Scope 
Agreements (Acuerdos de Alcance Parcial) were signed. Obstacles to significant inte-
gration still remained, but some of the contradictions were overcome or at least identi-
fied, and there was a growing realisation that a more active policy within the region 
and towards other regions (especially Europe) needed to be formulated. 
Economic performance in the region remained closely tied to the problem of debt 
management and the resulting decline in economic activity. In respect to debt man-
agement, Latin America expected Europe to be more understanding towards its possi-
bilities of refinancing its external debt. In 1985, Latin America owed US$ 235 billion to 
private creditors, 15.4% of which was in the hands of British banks, 8% with French 
banks, 3.5% with German banks and 2.1% with Spanish banks (SELA 1988). Due to 
the good provision made by European banks (in case Latin American countries de-
faulted), conditions for re-financing credits were more flexible than with other creditors 
in public banking. However, the relatively minor importance of European creditors 
compared with US creditors reduced the significance of Europe’s position. As regards 
trade, in the first half of the decade biregional trade was marked by the recessionary 
economic situation in Latin America. Imports from the European Community (EC) fell 
from US$ 18.3 billion in 1980 to US$ 11 billion in 1982 and only began to recover in 
1985. Latin American exports to the EC also performed relatively badly, falling from 
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US$ 22.7 billion in 1980 to US$ 21.3 billion in 1982. These gradually increased until 
1985, when they reached the same level as in 1980 (SELA 1988:124). 
As regards political developments, two interconnected events need to be high-
lighted: the democratisation wave in South America and the peace process in Central 
America. The return to democracy in Peru (in 1980 with the election of Belaúnde 
Terry), Argentina (in 1983 when Raúl Alfonsín was elected), Uruguay (in 1984 with the 
election of Julio María Sanguinetti), Brazil (in 1985 when Tancredo Neves won the 
elections) and Chile (in 1990 when Patricio Aylwin was elected) and the end of the 
Stroessner dictatorship in Paraguay (1989) fundamentally transformed the political 
basis for inter-regional relations. Since promotion of democracy was one of the aims of 
Europe’s foreign policy in Latin America, the replacement of military governments with 
democratic presidents was viewed by Europe as a positive development favouring 
closer contacts with the region. In the 1980s, therefore, political dialogue was more 
relevant for the biregional relationship than economic and trade links (Barrios 1999). 
Furthermore, Spain’s incorporation in the EC was an important factor in renewal of 
explaining a dialogue on issues of democracy. The victory of the Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua in 1979 and the United States’ subsequent 
application of the ”Reagan doctrine”, boosted links between the EC and Central Amer-
ica. EC support for the Contadora Group (formed by Colombia, Panama, Mexico and 
Venezuela) was a first step towards a qualitative new engagement in the region. The 
San José meeting thus marked the start of Europe’s new protagonism in the region. 
 
1.1. Integration schemes: euphoria, decadence and renewal 
Efforts to achieve integration have formed part of Latin America’s political discourse 
since the first independence movements. The Bolivarian ideals of building a single 
Latin American nation did not, however, become a concrete proposal until well into the 
twentieth century. By the 1960s, several parallel initiatives had been launched in an 
effort to create different sub-regional schemes that sought to achieve economic inte-
gration. In 1960, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and later Costa Rica 
signed a general agreement on economic integration aimed at creating a Central 
American Common Market within 10 years. In 1969, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador 
and Peru signed the Cartagena Agreement, which sought to reinforce sub-regional 
integration, but with the long-term goal of achieving regional integration. The most 
comprehensive initiative also dated from 1960: the Latin American Free Trade Asso-
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ciation (Asociación Latinoamericana de Libre Comercio, ALALC), which sought to 
promote intraregional trade through the gradual elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade 
barriers between Latin American countries. All these initiatives used periodical negotia-
tions to establish a common list of products to be exempt from duties and discussed 
different agreements for achieving industrial complementarity in key sectors.  
These first Latin American attempts at integration (see Schembri Carrasquilla 1996) 
were influenced by the European integration model. The Andean Group (now the An-
dean Community) is the clearest example of this European influence. In many ways, 
the Andean Group seemed to resemble the integration model adopted by the EC. The 
wide ranging goals of the Andean Group – the promotion of balanced, harmonious 
development in the member states through economic integration, the reduction of their 
foreign dependence, and the improvement of their position in the world economy – 
were similar to Europe’s integration aims. Moreover, the ambitious design of an institu-
tional organisation with supranational bodies, including a sub-regional court and a par-
liament, were closer to the European model than any other integration initiative. Euro-
pean integration policies were also used as a model by the Andean Group in more 
specific areas. Even the idea of introducing some sort of social compensation fund, 
such as exists in Europe, was discussed by the members (IRELA 1999). In view of 
these similarities to Europe’s integration model, it is not surprising that relations be-
tween both blocs were the first to be established between the European Community 
and a Latin American integration scheme. The two blocs signed a cooperation agree-
ment in 1983. 
In spite of the laudable aims established by these first integration initiatives, the crea-
tion of sub-regional or regional markets fell short of their declared aim. After a phase of 
euphoria, the schemes stalled politically and trade liberalisation proved to be limited. 
Many factors explain the lack of success in the integration processes and the crisis 
that affected them by the beginning of the 1980s. Those factors were partly inherent in 
the internal situation at regional level, and could be partly attributed to the external 
environment. As regards internal factors, the political instability and the surge of mili-
tary dictatorships in many countries made it difficult to improve relations between Latin 
American countries. A lack of mutual trust and the threat of territorial conflicts charac-
terised the period, and made difficult any kind of cooperation at the bilateral level. The 
overall economic strategy was another factor that hindered economic integration. Pro-
tectionist policies following the ISI stage were in fact hardly compatible with the dis-
mantling of trade barriers. Protectionism not only favoured state monopolies but also 
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hampered new export-oriented activities, thus reducing the interest in opening the 
economy. Negotiations for the establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET), 
which was viewed as an immediate first step towards closer integration, could never 
be accomplished because of difficulties in harmonising different national strategic in-
terests. Paradoxically in some cases, while most of the tariff obstacles were disman-
tled, trade was still hindered by non-tariff barriers (Pulgar 1996). As regards external 
factors, the permissive international situation of the 1970s gradually changed, and this 
became another obstacle to regional integration. After a period of constant expansion, 
world trade stalled, and the stability of the 1960s disappeared. The oil crisis and the 
liquidity of the international system led to the recycling of Petro-dollars that favoured 
external financial permissiveness. Under these circumstances, a greater Latin Ameri-
can commitment to regional integration was discouraged. 
In the 1980s, dissatisfaction with the achievements of regional integration led Latin 
American nations to modify their approach to the issue. In 1980 the ALALC was trans-
formed through the Montevideo Agreement into the Asociación Latinoamericana de 
Integración (ALADI). The incorporation of tolerance, flexibility and convergence princi-
ples in the agreement allowed Latin American countries to pursue their own national 
interests while developing a common integration strategy. This pragmatism enabled a 
compact network of agreements to be developed, not only among ALADI members but 
also with extra-regional partners. Strengthening bilateral relations was conceived as a 
first step to achieving regional integration. Although bilateralism was considered insuf-
ficient to support integration on a regional scale, it was certainly a more realistic alter-
native to allow some progress in integration within a critical context. Participation in the 
preliminary negotiations by the business sector and other relevant pressure groups, 
whose views were taken into account, was another key feature of ALADI’s strategy, 
which explains the better results of this second regional integration initiative 
(Rojas/Juan 1996). However, after changes agreed in 1980, the results did not match 
expectations. Multilateralization, which should be the second step after the promotion 
of bilateral preferences, was very modest, and the achievement of a Regional Tariff 
Preference (Preferencia Arancelaria Regional or PAR) remained an uncompleted task. 
The Caribbean states grouped in the CARICOM also reformed their instruments for 
sub-regional integration in order to adapt to new internal and external situations. In 
1987 the Andean countries also modified the legal nature of their agreement, in order 
to give the integration process more flexibility and pragmatism for the achievement of 
their objectives. Ambitious goals – such as the design of an industrial programme 
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aimed at sharing the benefits of integration proportionally to the development level – 
were postponed, as well as some of the liberalisation programmes. With the signing of 
the Quito Protocol, an effort was made to incorporate civil society sectors into the ne-
gotiations. Consideration of the social aspects of integration was another new feature 
of the agreement, which also included some modifications at the institutional level. 
However, the development of intra-regional trade remained at a low level, frustrating 
expectations that internal economic conditions would improve. Under the new disposi-
tions, the cooperation agreement signed with the EC came into force in 1987. This 
indirectly benefited the new impulse given to the integration process. 
In the Southern Cone, the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil initiated in the 
early 1980s culminated in 1986 with the signing of the Integration and Economic Co-
operation Programme (Program de Integración y Cooperación Argentina-Brasil, PI-
CAB). This agreement was a significant step forward with regard to the traditional and 
mutual mistrust fed by the strategic considerations of sovereignty typical of the military 
period. Although the economic asymmetry between both countries gave rise to some 
concerns – especially on the Argentine side – about the eventual distribution of inte-
gration benefits, Argentina and Brazil signed a series of sectoral Protocols regulating 
the development of bilateral cooperation (see Campbell/Rozemberg/Svarzman 1999). 
The critical evolution of the internal political situation by the end of the 1980s in both 
countries temporarily impeded a further deepening of the agreements. However, this 
process was given renewed impetus with the coming to power of new governments in 
Argentina and Brazil in 1989. In 1991 Argentina and Brazil, together with Paraguay 
and Uruguay, signed the agreemen in Asunción t creating the Mercado Común del Sur 
or MERCOSUR, that would prove to be the most dynamic Latin American integration 
initiative in the 1990s.  
This relaunch of integration processes gave the impression of a more flexible and 
open Latin America. It also enhanced the prospects for improving relations with 
Europe. Latin American sub-regional schemes also began to look for greater support 
from European countries, since they expected that a greater European presence in the 
region could better counterbalance that of the United States. Given the fact that the 
new approach of regional integration seemed to emphasise an active interaction with 
the world market, and that the political changes accomplished during the decade made 
the region a more accountable partner, European support for closer regional integra-
tion was, in the view of Latin American leaders, a viable alternative. Economic instabil-
ity, however, would severely limit the scope for cooperation in integration issues, since 
23 
progress stopped at an early stage in several economic restructuring processes. Nev-
ertheless, the foundations were laid for closer biregional cooperation in the coming 
decade.  
 
1.2. Democracy in Latin America: a necessary condition for a 
closer relationship 
Relations between Europe and Latin America have been based on common principles 
and values, particularly those of representative democracy, the rule of law and consti-
tutional order (IRELA 1997). For most Latin American countries Europe represented 
those democratic ideals (see Rodriguez Zúñiga 1988), and Latin America’s identifica-
tion with them has always been a typical feature of its political culture (Grabendorff 
1988), even if democratic practice has sometimes been erratic. In fact, both regions 
supported democracy in the past. During the Spanish civil war, some Latin American 
intellectuals cooperated closely with the Republican side (Vayssière 1999). On the 
other hand, the authoritarian coups that proliferated in Latin America during the 1970s 
were energetically condemned by European countries. Not only did individual coun-
tries and European authorities, especially the European Parliament, make general 
declarations about the internal political situation in Latin America, but they also issued 
specific statements about, for example, concrete violations of human rights (CELARE 
1996).  
This common pro-democratic ideology constituted the grounds for a close political dia-
logue. The first European- Latin American parliamentary conference, held in 1974 in 
Bogotá, is the oldest example of Europe’s interest in strengthening democratic values 
in the region. The conference marked the establishment of the main channel for politi-
cal dialogue at the biregional level. The following inter-parliamentary conferences, held 
every two years, further confirmed Europe’s commitment to democracy in the region. 
Such commitment consolidated Latin America’s perception of Europe as a valuable 
partner for the critical task of supporting democracy. Indeed, the political links between 
both regions at the parliamentary level survived even under precarious conditions. 
Even when Latin American parliaments were dissolved, representatives of the different 
parties continued to participate in the inter-parliamentary meetings. In 1979, therefore, 
members of the dissolved parliaments in Argentina, Uruguay and Chile took part in the 
fourth inter-parliamentary conference in Rome. 
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Due to the specificity of Latin America’s political situation in the 1970s, biregional po-
litical relations assumed very particular characteristics. The lack of internal political 
stability and the lack of critical democratic conditions perceivable in the dominance of 
dictatorships shifted the relationship between Europe and Latin America from govern-
ments to political parties. Parties were the real actors in political dialogue. Among 
them, social democrats were certainly the major protagonists. The Socialist Interna-
tional has been present in Latin America since the installation of a permanent secre-
tariat in Montevideo in 1955, but it began to act at the more technical level with the 
arrival of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (the research organisation of the German SPD). 
The increasing relevance of Latin America for European social democracy was made 
evident by the celebration of the Conference of European and Latin American Leaders 
for International Democratic Solidarity, organised by Willy Brandt in 1976. Latin Ameri-
can groups opposing military dictatorships met their European counterparts to de-
nounce the situation in the region and coordinate a common position. European influ-
ence was also evident in the organisation of Latin American parties. The Peruvian 
Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), the Venezuelan Acción De-
mocrática (AD), the Liberación Nacional (LN) of Costa Rica or the Partido Revolucion-
ario Dominicano (PRD) of the Dominican Republic were some of the parties from the 
democratic left that were organised according to European social democratic ideas 
(see Saarbach 1980). 
In the 1980s, the region experienced general – albeit heterogeneous – progress to-
wards the establishment of democratic conditions. Contrary to a sometimes unrefined 
conceptual generalisation (see O´Donnell 1979), countries in Latin America had differ-
ent starting points and went through specific transition processes in order to achieve 
democracy. Authoritarian governments in each country had different levels of institu-
tionalisation and repression, and the socio-political conditions prior to these authoritar-
ian governments also differed (countries like Uruguay or Chile with a long democratic 
tradition cannot be compared with others like Argentina or Brazil, that fluctuated be-
tween democracy and authoritarianism). Consequently, the transition to democracy 
was not similar in all countries. In spite of those differences, Europe was a strong sup-
porter and an attentive observer with regard to Latin American progress towards de-
mocracy. The European indifference and lack of public statements on Latin America’s 
situation, characteristic of the 1960s and 1970s, was definitively broken. Several dec-
larations from European institutions and analyses of different issues relating to the 
consolidation of democracy further confirmed Europe’s interest in Latin American de-
mocratisation processes. Once democracy was re-established, a significant political 
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obstacle to closer relations between Europe and Latin America was eliminated, and 
the basis set for common action at the political level (Van Klaveren 1991). 
Europe’s closer political identification with Latin America was largely due to the incor-
poration of Spain and Portugal in the European Community in 1986. Latin American 
countries viewed the incorporation of both countries into the European integration 
scheme with scepticism, 
 since they feared that it would have a negative affect on bilateral relations. However, it 
proved to be a positive step in the long term, especially for increasing awareness of 
Latin America in Europe. The incorporation of both countries was marked by their clear 
and repeated willingness to promote relations between both regions and to make Latin 
America a European priority. Evidence of this was the joint declaration of intentions 
that formed part of Spain’s and Portugal’s annexation contract to the EC. Moreover, a 
Spanish proposal was adopted at the European Council of The Hague in 1986 for 
strengthening relations with Latin America and supporting the peace initiative of the 
Contadora Group (see Flores 1988:87). The significance of Iberian influence was par-
ticularly evident in the Central American peace process. With the support of Spain and 
Portugal, the first San José conference was held in Costa Rica in 1984 (Flores 1988). 
The conference was attended by the five Central American countries and the four 
members of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Panama and Colombia). The 
continuity of these meetings institutionalised a political dialogue between both parties 
in respect of finding a political solution for the conflict in the sub-region. 
The role of Spain was also important for the transition processes, especially in the 
Southern Cone. Spain’s transition to democracy quickly acquired a special relevance 
for the democracy debate in the region. Spain’s successful management of the transi-
tion to democracy from the Franco regime became a model and a point of reference 
for most of Latin America. Felipe González, the Spanish Premier Minister, and King 
Juan Carlos emerged as influential figures in the political debates in Latin America. 
Even if the similarities were limited and the disparity of situations more than evident, 
some Latin American academics proposed a Moncloa Pact à l’espagnole as a way of 
expressing the commitment of all main social forces to democracy. Comparative stud-
ies were also in vogue, trying to extract some lessons from the Spanish experience 
that could prove useful to Latin America. Moreover, Spain quickly became aware of its 
potential influence on Latin America, and recognised the possibility of using the region 
as a convenient instrument to improve its relative position in the European arena (Roy 
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1997, Grugel 1997). By the end of the 1980s, Spanish intellectuals were beginning to 
discuss the idea of creating an ”Ibero- American space” (see for example del Arenal 
1992, Valdés 1992 and articles in Roy/Galisonga Jordá 1997). This resulted in the 
organisation of the first Ibero- American Summit in Guadalajara (Mexico) on 18- 19 
July 1991. 
The process of democratisation initiated in the 1980s made it possible for Latin Amer-
ica to overcome the international political isolation typical of the military period, and to 
increase its accountability at the international level. In addition, the consolidation of 
Europe’s position in the international system and the higher profile adopted in the defi-
nition of its areas of interest, allowed the design of a more concerted action between 
both regions in respect of political issues. However, economic instability in Latin Amer-
ica, which reduced the region’s attractiveness and made it more difficult to consolidate 
democracy, indirectly conditioned the development of biregional relations. As far as 
economic problems became a threat to democracy, foreign relations and foreign eco-
nomic relations were negatively affected. The case of Argentina (where the Alfonsín 
government, threatened by hyperinflation, suffered a number of military uprisings and 
was finally forced to relinquish power earlier than anticipated) was a clear example of 
the pervasive influence of negative economic conditions. 
 
1.3. Latin America’s economy in the 1980s: against a back-
ground of debt crises 
The 1980s were critical years for Latin America. The scope of the so-called ”lost dec-
ade” was marked by a sharp deterioration of the main economic and social indicators 
(see Schneider 1989), especially in the first half of the period. According to UNCTAD 
(1989) total GDP in the region grew by only 1.3% per year between 1980 and 1985, 
the value of imports fell 8% and that of exports by 0.8%. Per capita income in Argen-
tina stood at US$ 2,862 in 1988, almost 15% below that registered in 1980; in Uruguay 
it stood at US$ 2,989 in that same year, 7% below the 1980 level; and in Brazil it was 
US$ 2,449, 1.3% below the 1980 level (see Sangmeister 1990). Income distribution 
dramatically worsened: in the 1980s, the GDP share of the higher income decile in-
creased by over 10% at the cost of all other income deciles, while the poorest 10% 
suffered a 15% drop in its share of GDP (IDB 1999). The dismantling of social services 
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provided by the state was a logical consequence of the public administration reforms 
that were implemented, with significant impact on middle sectors. 
The restrictions on internal demand introduced to combat the debt crisis led to a sharp 
and prolonged recession. The uncontrolled increase in domestic prices (inflation) was 
another side-effect. Although Latin America had long been affected by inflation, in the 
1980s rates increased sharply, breaking past records. Inflation in Argentina reached 
an annual rate of 1,392% between 1986 and 1989, Peru 1,169% and Brazil 795% dur-
ing the same period (Helwege/Cardozo 1995:141). As an inflationary environment re-
duces the scope for manoeuvre with regard to planning, it has a negative impact on 
production strategies. Consequently, falling productivity was another secondary effect 
of unstable macroeconomic conditions. Internal production thus fell due to economic 
instability and the restrictions imposed by adjustment measures. This had a negative 
impact on the utilisation of available production capacity and the investment level nec-
essary to maintain machinery and a qualified work force (see CEPAL 1995:154f). 
Adjustment policies that were at first applied just to cope with the crisis had by the end 
of the decade become a general reorientation of the development strategy. This reori-
entation would profoundly change Latin America’s physiognomy in the 1990s. Export 
orientation, reduction of regulations, more reliance on market forces and an incipient 
elimination of protection mechanisms were the main results of the new strategic direc-
tion. The reorientation towards the world market was evident in the general reduction 
of trade barriers in the region. Thus, the coefficient of openness (the ratio of exports to 
GDP) in the region increased to 21% in 1990 from 14% in 1980, with some cases (Ar-
gentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile) increasing by more 
than 50% (CEPAL 1995:66). This marked openness and growing export dynamism 
was, however, insufficient to offset the negative effects of falling prices for primary 
products, which account for the greater part of exports from the region. Moreover, it did 
not offset a trend in world trade, somewhat worrying for developing countries: the in-
creasing concentration of world trade between the regions of the ”Triad” (European 
Community, United States and Asia-Pacific). By 1991, this group accounted for 85% of 
world trade (Bormann et al. 1995). 
As a result of the debt crisis, Latin American access to the international capital markets 
remained restricted throughout the decade. Between 1983 and 1989 Latin America 
and the Caribbean countries received just US$ 8.1 billion, an insignificant amount 
compared with the US$ 20.1 billion and US$ 39.8 billion received in 1982 and 1981 
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respectively (CEPAL 1995). The near impossibility of receiving new loans placed Latin 
America in a de facto default situation. Capital restriction was aggravated by capital 
flight from residents, which according to World Bank estimates represented almost 
US$ 90 billion (World Bank 1993). High interest rates in the international markets and 
uncertainty about the final outcome of adjustment programmes applied in the region 
exacerbated the capital flight. The impact on internal investment rates was tremen-
dous. In Argentina, for example, investment fell to 11.3% and 8.5% of GDP in 1984 
and 1985 respectively compared with 18.8% in 1981. Investment in Uruguay also fell 
sharply: to 9.9% in 1984 compared with 15.4% in 1981. In Brazil the fall was less se-
vere, from 21.1% in 1981 to 15.5% in 1984 and 16.7% in 1985 (IDB 1989). This situa-
tion began to be reversed in 1989, when Latin American countries gained access to 
the bonds market. However, a restoration of investment flows, which could allow a 
certain accumulation of capital and the recovery of structural investment, only began in 
the 1990s. 
With the democratisation wave and the parallel intensification of biregional contacts, 
Latin American governments hoped that the political will shown by Europe would also 
translate into progress at the biregional economic relations level (see Van Klaveren, 
1991). Latin America’s perception of the European Union as a flexible and non-
coercive international actor in political issues raised expectations that it would behave 
similarly on economic questions. Furthermore, with economic modernisation Latin 
American governments expected greater European commitment. Expectations were 
partly based on the assumption that Latin America’s recovered democracy was a ful-
filled pre-requisite for closer cooperation. However, even if the prevalence of democ-
racy was certainly a necessary condition, it was not sufficient by itself. In that sense, 
the results of cooperation at the economic level in the 1980s remained behind Latin 
American expectations. Although European investment in the region increased com-
pared with previous periods, it remained at a modest level. As for trade, the traditional 
structure of exchanges did not basically change. Latin America’s exports to Europe 
continued to be concentrated in food, agricultural products and raw minerals, which 
represented 52.3% of exports between 1970 and 1989 (Puyana 1994:57). Moreover, 
imports from Latin America as a proportion of total European imports fell steadily. 
European imports from Latin America, which represented more than 8% in 1970, 
dropped to 5.9% in 1980 and to 5.5% in 1990. European exports to Latin America as a 
proportion of total Latin American imports also fell, from 6.4% in 1980 to just 3.7% in 
1990 (see Lerman Alperstein 1998:271). As the figures show, Latin America’s expecta-
tions in terms of its economic relations with Europe were not fulfilled. 
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2 Latin America in the 1990s 
2.1. A changing global system 
The 1990s witnessed a series of important changes in the global system at the eco-
nomic and political level. Those changes in part continued processes launched during 
the preceding decades but partly were the result of qualitatively different transforma-
tions resumed in the increasing density of multidimensional networks of interdepend-
ence between international actors (see Keohane/Nye 2000). Phenomena like the in-
crease in cross-border investment, the confluence of information technologies and the 
rise of cross-country strategic planning were observed. At the same time, the debate 
on the State's authority intensified, and international politics witnessed the rise of new 
international actors. Moreover, increasing factor mobility and the homogenisation of 
development strategies and consumption patterns were impacting on the global, inter-
regional, sub-regional and domestic systems, transforming the patterns of economic 
and political interaction between actors. 
At the political level, the main changes were unleashed with the end of the Cold War. 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. and the consequent 
mutation of a bipolar system into a multi-polar system caused strategic and political 
calculations to suffer important transformations: 
?? First, the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. implied a redefinition of the power structure 
within the international system. New opportunities and threats appeared for me-
dium powers trying to adapt to different rules in the strategic game and looking for 
a better position in the international hierarchy. Not only Cuba and other countries in 
Latin America that received direct support from the U.S.S.R. were obliged to re-
think their extra-hemispheric policy. Central America in particular had the chance 
to re-address the problem of U.S. intervention in the sub-region, but also other 
countries in the region saw a window of opportunity to give a new orientation to 
their hemispheric relations. Given Latin America's disposition to counterbalance 
the U.S. influence in the region, an approach to Europe, the only power with the 
possibility of becoming a global player in a short time, rapidly became an important 
option in Latin America's new global strategy. However, a certain ambivalence per-
sisted about how Latin America should define an active external insertion pattern 
and how it should deal with the U.S.- European option. The U.S. was not the asser-
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tive hegemonic power it had been during the Cold War, nor did Europe seem to be 
ready to assume a global role. Thus, unilateral alignment from the Latin American 
perspective was difficult to justify and, with the exception of Argentina under Me-
nem's Presidency, was not adopted. Most of the countries preferred to take advan-
tage of playing both sides. 
?? Secondly, assuming that during the Cold War intercontinental interdependence 
was limited to those regions under the protection of one of the two powers, it was 
logical that the end of bi-polarity would create new possibilities for intercontinental 
networking. This opening of a window of opportunity for more intense interregional 
relationships and the existence of a common language for discussing mutually in-
teresting fields was conducive to expectations of progress in biregional coopera-
tion. The existence of a common interest in historic, cultural and political matters 
between Europe and Latin America made the efforts of both regions to come 
closer more reasonable. Another implication of the emergence of a multi-polar sys-
tem was the consolidation of democratic values in the political doctrine. Thus, con-
solidating democracy helped Latin America to reinforce its membership in western 
civilization. Europe's support for democracy in Latin America in the previous dec-
ades had already created many reliable channels of political dialogue between 
both regions. These channels seemed likely to be expanded and consolidated. 
?? Thirdly, for Latin American in particular, the political transformation achieved in 
Eastern Europe introduced a new factor in the field of financing development. The 
fall of communism in Eastern European Countries (EEC) was accompanied by the 
decision to adopt democratic systems and free-market mechanisms. This new po-
litical orientation eliminated the main obstacle at the political level to becoming 
candidates for entering the European Union, which in turn was interested in incor-
porating them in order to stabilize the area and to secure natural economic part-
ners for the EU. The conflicts unleashed in the Balkans showed Europe the risk in 
abandoning the region and reaffirmed the necessity of helping to improve their 
socio-economic conditions. Incorporation implied significant amounts of capital 
transfer and direct aid in order to support the reforms required for placing the EECs 
at a development level compatible with the EU. Latin America feared a concentra-
tion of European investment in the EECs and eventually a concentration of trade 
as well. 
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?? Fourthly, the triumph of liberal democracy after the collapse of communist coun-
tries made an alternative model no longer viable. Consolidating electoral proc-
esses, improving representation and decision-making systems and strengthening 
general democratic conditions became clear imperatives. Most Latin American 
countries made considerable progress in consolidating their democracies, in spite 
of adverse conditions (see Barrios/Boeckh 2000, Nohlen/Thibaut 1993). Even if the 
stability of democratic regimes sometimes seemed to be challenged by their na-
tional armies, many countries like Argentina (1989), Brazil (1989), Uruguay (1989) 
and Chile (1993) inaugurated a second democratic period during the decade. As a 
consequence of the need to respect the procedures of liberal democracy, the ori-
entation of foreign policy as well as regional strategy had to be reformulated. For-
eign policy was reformulated in order to consolidate Latin America's position 
among the democratic nations and to reinforce its commitment to human rights and 
the rule of the law. In spite of a trade-off between the new foreign policy orienta-
tions and sovereignty restrictions typical of Latin America's political code, countries 
made significant efforts to establish more friendly relations with neighbouring coun-
tries. Therefore many frontier conflicts were solved during this period (the only no-
table exception being the Peruvian/Ecuadorian conflict). 
At the economic level, four typical features characterised the economy during the 
1990s. First of all, there was the lowered dynamism displayed by industrialised coun-
tries. With the exception of the U.S., which had begun its recovery by the middle of the 
1990s, growth in industrialised countries was slow. This is especially true when com-
pared with previous decades (3.1% between 1970 and 1980, 2.6% between 1980 and 
1990, and 2.1 between 1990 and 2000). Secondly, there was a noticeable peak in the 
rhythm of technological change that modified the conditions for technology transfers. 
Thirdly, there was a significant increase in the mobility of capital flows and new instru-
ments appeared in the international financial structure. Capital mobility certainly facili-
tated the necessary capital inflow for many developing countries, but it was not free of 
collapses. The Mexico crisis in 1995 was overcome principally thanks to the U.S. inter-
vention trying to preserve the financial stability of its NAFTA-partner. In 1997 Asia, a 
region that assumed an increasingly protagonist stance in the global economy during 
the first half of the decade and received large-scale foreign capital, suffered a sudden 
withdrawal of private funds, unleashing one of the sharpest crises after the debt crises 
of the 1980s. Finally, there was a general re-structuring of the international markets 
(see CEPAL 1995), marked by the increasing role of Asia and the significant growth in 
world trade compared with world production. The Final Act agreed upon at the end of 
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the GATT's Uruguay Round seemed to give a promising sign for developing countries 
about the new possibilities for insertion into a re-structuring world market (see IRELA 
1994:145ff for prospects before ending the Round). 
Closely connected with the changes mentioned at the political level and with the uncer-
tainty derived from them is the multiplication of "defensive" economic strategies like 
the creation of economic blocs.  This phenomenon can be signalled as one of the most 
characteristic developments at the economic level for the 1990s. As Axline (1996:199) 
points out, the emergence (or resurgence) of regional trade blocs represents a differ-
ent form of regionalism, characterised by its major objective of guaranteeing bloc 
members greater security in their international economic relations in a context of in-
creasing vulnerability. Since the European region overcame the Euro-pessimism of the 
1980s and the objective of a single market seemed closer, a trade bloc fever attacked 
other world regions. The consolidation of European integration meant that many coun-
tries would have to question how to react to such apparently dwindling alternatives to a 
diversion of trade. The establishment of a Common Market in 1993 was seen as a 
clear example of increasing isolationism in the industrialized countries and likely to 
have a negative impact on developing countries (see Meller 1993, Hufbauer 1991, 
Krugman 1991). In the light of this, promoting one's own regional alternatives seemed 
a quite rational option. It is necessary to point out that, although evidence on the nega-
tive consequences of the European Single Market for Latin America is mixed, govern-
ments in the region adopted a pessimistic position (IRELA 1994). They considered 
local regionalist strategies as instrumental in offsetting, at least partially, the expected 
effects of trade diversion. 
Another important transformation with impact on Latin America was provoked by the 
decreasing relevance of strategic considerations typical of the Cold War, which implies 
re-formulating strategic safety areas into economic interest areas. Strategic reflections, 
at least as they used to be during bipolar confrontation, were no longer the basis for 
foreign policy decisions.The U.S. initiative for the creation of a free trade agreement 
with Mexico was probably the clearest example of this transformation. As Tulchin 
(1997) notes, the NAFTA initiative was first and foremost  
a possibility to preserve a safety area without risking a real "open-regionalist" alterna-
tive and based on domestic economic considerations. A similar type of consideration 
also helps to explain a previous American initiative: the Enterprise for the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) launched by George Bush Sr. on June 27, 1990. EAI first and NAFTA 
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second represent an American response to adapt to new conditions in the world sys-
tem following the transformations produced in Eastern Europe. The U.S. thus con-
ceived regionalism as an instrument to counterbalance multilateralism and to consoli-
date America's regional position vis-à-vis Europe. 
In Latin America in particular, some developments at the economic level can be men-
tioned due to their relevance to the biregional relations: 
- Policy orientations in most countries seemed to confirm the direction adopted tim-
idly during the 1980s. Privatization, deregulation, trade openings and State reforms 
represented the core of an economic strategy trying to achieve a more dynamic in-
sertion into the world market. Moreover, the strategies for promoting export activi-
ties were aimed at overcoming the Latin American tendency to discourage the ex-
port sector. Moreover, in spite of this general trend, national experiences differed 
from each other. Timing and sequence of the reforms varied from one country to 
another. For example, while Argentina had already reformed its exchange, tax and 
tariff systems early in the 1990s, some Brazilian reforms were still pending at the 
end of the decade. 
- Although it was decreasing, a bias against added value on export products still 
persisted. In general, Latin American countries preferred to expand traditional ex-
ports, like foods and agricultural products, while just a modest effort was made to 
support new activities or products with more value added. The decline in protection 
of domestic markets (unilateral tariff reduction was a common strategy in the whole 
region) was not accompanied by aggressive export promotion programme as hap-
pened in Asian countries (Bird/Helwege 1994). 
- Net capital flows increased, especially during the first years of the decade, reflect-
ing investors' confidence in macroeconomic conditions and the attractiveness of 
high interest rates and privatization programme. Capital flow was not due to a re-
turn to bank lending, but mainly linked to direct high investment. Although high in-
vestment flows were seen as a positive sign, short-term maturity of bonds was a 
cause of concern. Moreover, the impact on domestic currencies, which suffered a 
significant appreciation in most cases (CEPAL 1995), was a disquieting feature of 
the economic context and likely to have long-term negative impacts on export per-
formance. 
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- Changing global conditions led to the consolidation of the direction of regionalism. 
Integration approaches tended to emphasize flexible instruments and to set less 
ambitious temporal limits to achieving integration goals. Unilateral tariff elimination 
in Latin America during the previous decade had reduced the obstacles for intra-
regional trade, inaugurating a dynamic phase. The signing of the Asuncion Treaty 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 created the Common 
Market of the South (Mercosur).  This will prove to be the most dynamic sub-
regional integration scheme during the 1990s following the new direction of region-
alism. 
 
2.2. Biregional relations in the 1990s 
In the rapidly changing context of the post-Cold War era, Latin America's political and 
economic transformations can be considered a result of, as well as an answer to, 
adapting to new global conditions.  In the 1990s, the region was definitely committed to 
a new type of action at the international level in order to support its long-term devel-
opment goals. While Latin America's radical economic reforms created new prospects 
for its policies of openness, democratic conditions bestowed a greater level of ac-
countability on its external policies. Following IRELA (1997), some common elements 
can be identified in the foreign policies of Latin American countries: 
Diversif ication efforts. The region was clearly committed to gaining a competitive 
position and exploiting market opportunities in other regions of the world.  Further-
more, the region looked to take advantage of the new impulse for diversification poli-
cies conferred by an increasingly interdependent world economy. 
- New regionalism. Integration was seen as an instrument to achieve a more 
competitive position in the world economy and to consolidate regional stability. Fol-
lowing increasing intra-American ties, a new balance was reached in the hierarchy 
of relations with other regions and/or countries of the world. 
- International concern for domestic poli t ical issues. As a result of democ-
ratization, Latin America began to adopt a more open attitude towards international 
concerns about issues traditionally under national sovereignty, like democracy and 
human rights. 
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Growing mult i lateral ism. Latin America intensified its participation in multilateral 
forums for economic issues (like the World Trade Organization, WTO) and for political 
issues (like the United Nations, UN). This was the result of a new attitude towards 
such organizations, reflecting the growing concern with the regional impact of interna-
tional and transnational problems. 
All these elements characterizing Latin America's new form of external relations were 
reflected in Latin America's relationship with Europe during the 1990s. Thus, contrary 
to some opinions predicting an increasing gap between both regions, the relationship 
made significant progress during the past decade. However, this progress was quite 
heterogeneous. As Latin America's physiognomy transformed and changes in the 
European Union continued, a new range of needs and expectations challenged the 
biregional relations. Three simultaneous, complementary and somehow partially ex-
cluding processes characterized the biregional relations during the 1990s: the broad-
ening of the biregional agenda, the deepening of inter-regional relations and the focus-
ing of interest. 
a) Broadening the agenda 
With the economic and political transformations that occurred in Latin America, new 
topics entered the agenda of the relations with Europe. As shown in the European 
Commission's communication to the Council of 23 October 1995, "The European Un-
ion and Latin America: Present Situation and Prospects for Closer Partnership, 1996-
2000 Guidelines for Cooperation", new fields like drugs, corruption, integration, envi-
ronment and security appeared during the 1990s on the agenda of biregional relations. 
Drugs. Since the end of the Cold War, drug trafficking has emerged as one of the 
most potentially conflictive fields in the biregional relations. The supranational and mul-
tidimensional character of drugs (including aspects like organized crime, money laun-
dering and consumption) made the issue a cornerstone in EU- Latin American coop-
eration. The traditional distinction between "producers" and "consumers" became more 
vague, helping to merge Europe’s and Latin America's positions on the subject. The 
first High Level Meeting on Drugs between the EU and Latin America was held in 
Brussels on 23 and 24 March 1998.  
Environment. Environmental issues were increasingly considered as the other side 
of the liberalization of international trade, even if there is no consensus about how the 
first would be affected through the second. However, there is agreement that environ-
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mental restriction impacts on the conditions of competitiveness, because they increase 
production costs. The EU considers developmental cooperation not as a special kind 
of cooperation but as a sort of consideration to be included in all areas of biregional 
cooperation. On their side,  developing countries tend to see the implementation of 
international environmental standards as a form of disguised protectionism (see Dre-
konja Kornat 1997). 
Corruption. The fight against corruption increasingly occupied the attention of both 
regions. Corruption is seen as a source of distortion of market forces, of instability for 
the political climate and of destruction for democratic institutions. The reduction of cor-
ruption is considered to be one of the most relevant aspects to be reinforced in order 
to allow closer political and economic cooperation between both regions. Charges of 
corruption are often at the base of problematic relations between both regions. 
Integration. The new dynamic showed by the integration processes in both regions 
allowed a certain convergence between established integration programme. Deeper 
integration within both regions is not considered an obstacle for intensified relations 
between Europe and Latin America. Moreover, the nature of the relations between the 
regions will depend on the outcome of each integration process. 
Security. From the outset, the reduction of arms and the prevention of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction have been on the agenda of biregional relations. How-
ever, both regions faced very different security issues. With the end of the Cold War, 
Europe and Latin America found themselves facing more similar issues resulting from 
the end of bipolarity and the obsolescence of traditional defence and security doc-
trines. 
b) Deepening the relationship 
During the past decade, agreements between Latin America and the EU adopted a 
qualitatively different approach. The 1990s saw the signing of several so called "third 
generation agreements", such as the Andean Pact, which differed qualitatively from 
previous agreements (first and second generation). Third generation agreements were 
much more ambitious than their predecessors because they covered new issues of 
bilateral relations like development, technical and scientific cooperation. They also 
included a democratic clause setting democratic conditions as a necessary require-
ment to participating in the agreements. Furthermore, an "evaluative" clause allowed 
transformations in the conditions of existing negotiations without major re-formulations. 
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Thus, negotiations with individual countries could be driven through in parallel with 
those for regional schemes, where those individual countries were included (see 
Lamothe 1996).  
Analysing the recent development of the biregional relationship, progress can be ob-
served mainly in three areas: political dialogue, cooperation and the commercial and 
economic aspects of the relationship. 
Polit ical dialogue. The political dialogue between the EU and the different sub-
regional schemes was particularly intense during the 1990s. A greater institutionaliza-
tion of the existing mechanisms and the creation of new channels characterized the 
political dialogue throughout the decade. 
1. The San José Dialogue, the oldest forum for political discussion between the EU 
and a Latin American sub-region, was fundamentally renewed during the 12th Min-
isterial Meeting held in Florence in 1996. Through a Common Solemn Declaration 
both parties agreed to hold the Ministerial Meetings every two years and to organ-
ize intermediate meetings between the Presidency of the SICA (Central American 
Integration System) and the European troika. The EU reiterated its support for the 
Central American peace process and reaffirmed its commitment to support recon-
struction in the sub-region (Arrieta Munguía 1999). 
2. The Rio Group- EU dialogue celebrated its first decade in 2000 during the Vilam-
oura Meeting held on 23 and 24 February in Portugal. During the meeting both par-
ties agreed on the main issues that will occupy the biregional dialogue during the 
next decade: the establishment of a strategic partnership, the creation of an eco-
nomic association, the consolidation of cooperation, cooperation on security issues 
and shared responsibility on drug issues. The Río Group- EU dialogue has helped 
to facilitate Latin American access to European programme for science and tech-
nology. It also allowed the beginning of a discussion on one of the main Latin 
American problems: European protectionism and low Latin American competitive-
ness in industrial production. 
3. An informal political dialogue was initiated between the CAN and the EU in 1994 
following the guidelines set by the Framework Agreement which was signed on 23 
April in Copenhagen. Presidential meetings, regular ministerial encounters and 
meetings between the European Parliament and the Andean Parliament consti-
tuted the main instruments of this dialogue. In 1996 the dialogue was institutional-
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ized through a Joint Declaration. A bi-regional Commission was charged with su-
pervising the application of the resolutions adopted at biregional level (see IRELA 
1999). 
4. The Summit of Heads of State and Governments of Latin America, the Caribbean 
and Europe held in Rio de Janeiro on 28 and 29 June, 1999 constituted the most 
recent and relevant event for the bi-regional political dialogue. The Summit had 
historical importance regardless of the concrete achievements, because it showed 
the political commitment existing in both regions to the idea of establishing a stra-
tegic partnership. The "new" political dialogue between Mercosur, Chile and Mex-
ico differed from the traditional European orientation that tended to give priority to 
regional dialogues. This new orientation was expressed in the document elabo-
rated by the German Presidency of the Council in October 1994, where dialogue 
was not only defined as a priority for the whole region but also with sub-regions 
and countries as well. 
5. Cooperation. As a direct consequence of the economic transformation registered 
in Latin America, cooperation between both regions changed fundamentally during 
the 1990s, reflecting a new emphasis on economic and trade relations. The EU 
continued to  represent the major source of Official Development Aid (ODA) for 
Latin America, accounting for half of the total ODA received by Latin America dur-
ing 1998, exceeding Japan (12.7%) and the U.S. (12.3%). U.S. aid represented 
492 million dollars, half the amount registered in 1994, while Japan, with 508 mil-
lion, represented half the aid for 1995. ODA has decreased since the mid-1990s 
from $5.6 billion in 1995 to $4 billion in 1998 (IRELA 2000). This reduction reflects 
the confluence of some negative trends: a recession in the European continent, 
political pressures to cut government expenditures (especially by the main donors, 
France and Germany) and to meet convergence criteria, and the incorporation of 
EEC in the group of aid receptors (Calderón 1996). However, in per capita terms 
the region still features as the second most important recipient of global ODA after 
Africa. As for regional distribution, Bolivia, Peru and Nicaragua were the principal 
destinations for European aid, accounting for more than 35% of the total European 
ODA received by Latin America (IRELA 2000). 
6. The evolution of cooperation with the European Union during the 1990s was not 
especially satisfactory for Latin America. Although economic cooperation in-
creased, financial and technical cooperation declined as a result of the higher de-
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velopment achieved by Latin America. However, according to Latin America, im-
provement in quantitative indicators hid increasing disparities between sub-
regions. The different programs and budgetary lines (Technical and Financial As-
sistance, Humanitarian Aid and Economic Cooperation, see Alperstein 1998) 
channelling the European resources to Latin America modified its relative weight 
during the 1990s. Technical and Financial Assistance, representing almost 70% of 
total aid by the beginning of the 1990s, declined to 39.3% in 1998. Humanitarian 
Aid also reduced its importance in the total aid package, decreasing to 46.4% in 
1998. Moreover, Emergency Aid tended to absorb an increasing part of the Hu-
manitarian Aid, to the detriment of "regular" aid. This tendency was reinforced after 
the creation in 1992 of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO). In 
contrast, during recent years Economic Cooperation has increased its importance 
in the total amount of cooperation. Several specific programme for Latin America, 
subsumed under Economic Cooperation, were launched during the 1990s: 
7. AL-INVEST. Initiated in 1994, the programme aims at promoting direct invest-
ment in the region, technology transfer, strategic alliances and joint-ventures be-
tween Europe and Latin America. The programme was financed with 20 million 
ECUs. Several Eurocenters were created in Latin America to organize and facili-
tate contacts between both regions.  
8. ALURE (Amérique Latine Utilisation Optimale de Ressources Energétiques). The 
program was initiated in 1996 to support the modernization of energy systems in 
Latin America and promote regional energy integration. The program has at its 
disposal over 50 million Euros, and it is complemented by SYNERGY, another 
programme created to support environmentally friendly energy policies. 
9. ALFA (América Latina-Formación Académica). The programme was created in 
1994 to contribute to Latin America's scientific, academic and technological devel-
opment. It works through cooperation and exchanges between institutions of  
higher education in Europe and Latin America, with a budget of more than 40 mil-
lion Euros for a six year period. 
10. URB-AL. The programe aimed at establishing permanent networks between 
European and Latin American cities, having a budget of 21 million ECUs over a pe-
riod of four years. Projects by URB-Al cover issues such as urbanization manage-
ment, urban democracy and social policy. 
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Trade and economic relations.  Economic relations between Europe and Latin 
America did progress, but in an ambivalent way. Biregional trade has recently been 
marked by a sustained expansion, but it has grown at a lower level than the expansion 
of trade within both regions or with other regions of the world. Trade between both 
regions increased from 56 billion dollars in 1990 to 90 billion in 1997. This develop-
ment was mainly explained by the evolution of European exports to Latin America.  For 
Europe, Latin America became one of their. most dynamic markets during the past few 
years. Furthermore, European firms showed that they were prepared to take advan-
tage of the transformation process experienced by the region during the prior decade 
(see Iglesias 1999). However, although annual trade flows between the EU and Latin 
America grew steadily in terms of value during the 1990s, the EU’s share of Latin 
America's external trade fell during most of the period (from 23% in 1990 to 15% in 
1997, with a modest increase to 16% in 1998 (IRELA 2000). Moreover, Latin Amer-
ica's specialization in agricultural products remained invariable in its relations with the 
EU. Partly as result of the trade diversion effects registered after the creation of the 
single market (IRELA 1994:398), and partly due to the lack of European incentives to 
modify its specialization pattern, Latin American continued concentrate its political ef-
fort on the liberalization of the European agricultural sector. 
The signing of the Inter-regional Framework Cooperation Agreement between Merco-
sur and the EU on December 15, 1995 represented a milestone in biregional economic 
relations. The agreement, aimed at establishing a free trade zone between both re-
gions (see below), opened new perspectives for the commercial relationship between 
Europe and Latin America.  This was especially true considering the expansion ambi-
tions of the southern bloc. Another agreement for liberalizing trade and enhancing co-
operation was signed between Mexico and the EU on May 2, 1995. This agreement 
resulted from recognizing the negative impact of Mexico's incorporation into NAFTA for 
the European trade interests. From 1994 to 1995 European exports to Mexico fell by 
29.4% while Mexican imports in the EU increased by 28.3% (IRELA 1997). The sign-
ing of an FTA-agreement was seen as an instrument to avoid a further deterioration of 
the European market share in Mexico, and to favour investment, especially since Mex-
ico is the second main destination for European investors after Mercosur. 
c) Focusing the interest 
Continuing the guidelines adopted between 1995 and 2000, Latin America, in its com-
munication "A new European Union- Latin America partnership on the Eve of the 21st 
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Century (2000- 2006)", stated policies towards the region should further differentiate 
between countries and regions in Latin America. The European emphasis on a differ-
entiated approach to the region was officially based on the imperative of recognizing 
the specific nature and needs of the different sub-regions in Latin America. Moreover, 
it reflects a differentiated European interest in the region. This strategy proved to be 
not only a temporary orientation, but a clear indication of European priorities in the 
region. This sub-regionalization of European policy towards Latin America was re-
flected in the signing of  two agreements with sub-regional partners:  
?? Mexico: On 2 May 1995, the EU and Mexico signed a Solemn Common Declara-
tion expressing their intention to negotiate an agreement aimed at intensification of 
the political dialogue, the strengthening of bilateral cooperation and a progressive 
liberalization of trade. On 26 June 1996, the Council of Ministers approved the 
mandate authorizing the formal beginning of the dialogue. Negotiations were con-
cluded on 24 November 1999, and the agreement was officially adopted during the 
Summit in Lisbon, last 23 and 24 March. 
?? Mercosur: On 15 December 1995, the EU and Mercosur signed an inter-regional 
cooperation agreement, which should be in force until the approval of a more ambi-
tious agreement for a biregional association, including the creation of a Free Trade 
Zone. However, the mandate could not be approved until June 21, 1999 (IRELA 
2000). This also authorized the beginning of parallel negotiations with Chile. So far, 
three rounds were organized during 2000, but the type of agreement that will finally 
be reached is still far from clear. 
3. The EU- Latin America/Caribbean Summit 
3.1. The dynamics of the convocation 
Coinciding with the end of the old Millenium and the beginning of a new one, the 
Heads of State and Governments of Latin America, the Caribbean and the EU cele-
brated a first biregional meeting in Rio de Janeiro on June 28 and 29, 1999. The meet-
ing was the result of a Spanish- French combined initiative. President Aznar first pre-
sented the idea of organising a meeting after the fourth Ibero- American Summit in 
Viña del Mar (Chile) on November 11 1996. President Chirac took the initiative again 
during a visit to South America in 1997. He stated on this occasion that Latin Amer-
ica’s future should not be conceived just within the narrow framework of north- south 
hemispheric relations, but was also closely related to Europe, with whom a relationship 
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was easier to conceive due to cultural and historical links (Sotillo 1998). On 2 June 
1997 the Council of General Affairs approved the proposal to hold a biregional summit, 
suggesting careful preparation of the event to provide the best chance of achieving 
concrete results. The convocation was officially approved at the European Council of 
Amsterdam on 17 June 1997 and Commissioner Marin suggested holding the meeting 
during the first half of 1999. Furthermore the agenda was to include the three main 
issues of cooperation, political dialogue and trade. His final suggestion was that all 
countries from both regions should be represented in spite of the probable practical 
limitations. 
For Latin America and the Caribbean, the organisation of a Summit presented an un-
usual opportunity to examine the different aspects of biregional relations, highlighting 
their strengths and weaknesses (De Brito 2000). Latin American expectations for the 
Summit were high and, from their perspective, the meeting was to give a clear sign of 
the priority that the relationship with Latin America would have for the EU in the future. 
According to SELA (1998) the Summit was to indicate action in five main fields: 
?? The definition of issues to be covered by a strategic biregional alliance based on 
the principle of ”common shared interests” and ”mutual benefits”. This would imply 
the replacement of the traditional criteria of ”aid” and ”structural differences” by 
those of ”reciprocal cooperation” and ”equilibrated partnership”. 
?? The adoption of common policies aimed at addressing the current international 
crisis and contributing to a mutually binding solution for future global problems. The 
formulation of a common strategy aimed at positioning the biregional relation more 
advantageously in the global system. 
?? The creation of a biregional framework for designing cooperative policies enhanc-
ing the transfer of technical expertise necessary to alleviate the region’s poverty 
and inequality and improving the quality of life. 
?? The strengthening of the political commitments adopted during the discussions and 
the establishment of procedures to grant their implementation and follow-up.  
?? The demonstration of a political will for deepening and broadening the biregional 
relation in accordance with progress achieved at multilateral levels. 
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3.2. The results: between criticism and optimism  
In spite of some criticism by certain specialists about the modest results of the Summit, 
a Latin American evaluation generally emphasises the broad agreement on the gen-
eral principles of the biregional relations. In the Joint Declaration issued after the 
Summit, the participants expressed their conviction that a strategic partnership should 
be based on full compliance with International Law, the purposes and principles con-
tained in the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of non-intervention, respect 
for sovereignty, equality among States, and self-determination. The relationship should 
be built upon and contribute to the furthering of common objectives, such as strength-
ening representative and participatory democracy and individual freedom, the rule of 
law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security, political stability 
and building confidence among nations (Council of the European Union 1999). This 
shared political vision of the relationship is repeatedly signalled as an important basis 
for establishing a strategic alliance. 
Latin America was aware that the Summit could not resolve several conflicting points 
shaping the biregional relationship in other domains (especially at the commercial 
level) but hoped that it could represent a step towards a mutually satisfying solution. 
Tendencies in biregional trade confirm an increasing Latin American deficit and a de-
cay in the relative importance of European markets for Latin American exports. Global 
Latin American exports were augmented between 1990 and 1997 by almost 90%, 
while exports to the EU increased by just 16%. In comparative analysis, exports to the 
US increased by 118%, to Asia by 80% and intra-regionally by 150% during the same 
period (see Iglesias 1999:38). Unless this tendency can be reversed, Latin American 
incentives for participating in a strategic partnership giving this relation priority over 
other hemispheric alternatives will be reduced. If Latin America do not see the possibil-
ity of having profits equal to the EU in all domains included in the partnership, efforts to 
overcome the existing conflicts will diminish. 
The expected parallel announcement of the launching of negotiations with Mercosur 
and Chile was probably the most concrete sign of the European commitment to free 
trade negotiations and the Summit’s most concrete outcome. Mercosur actually ac-
counted for more than half of European sales to Latin America (OECD 1998) but the 
subrregion has a large trade deficit with Europe in the industrial sector. Free trade be-
tween the EU and Mercosur is likely to be advantageous for some European sectors, 
like automobiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery or even alcoholic beverages 
and pastries, because Mercosur actually applies high duties (round 30% on average) 
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and European products are more competitive and enjoy a better reputation (Rubiolo 
2000a). As for Mercosur, the trade agreement would basically grant easier access to 
the European market for food, agricultural and fishery products, which account for al-
most half of Mercosur exports to Europe. However, the difficulties found in the EU for 
approving the launch of the negotiations and the European objection to modifying the 
Common Agricultural Policy (PAC) in the context of negotiations with Mercosur have 
already shown that reaching a trade agreement will not be an easy task, even if 
agreements in the other two domains of the negotiations (political dialogue and coop-
eration) are achieved. 
As Crawley (2000:13) states, the ”EU’s stress on interdependence and mutual benefit 
in its relations with Latin America contrasts with what has been perceived as Washing-
ton’s exclusive pursuit of national interest” in the region. European support for Latin 
American integration efforts is contrasted with US initiatives that apparently compete 
with regional alternatives (see the likely incorporation of Chile in the NAFTA vs. Mer-
cosur enlargement plans). Moreover, the European concept of ”co-responsibility” on 
drugs is contrasted with the US award on drugs (IRELA 1999). These contrasts, as 
well as the traditional links already mentioned, made any European initiative in the 
past likely to be a more ”balanced” alternative than its U.S. counterpart. Nevertheless, 
this initial European advantage has been partially offset during recent years. 
The lack of substantial results on economic issues has increased Latin America’s 
scepticism about European commitment to a responsible commercial attitude, which is 
from the Latin American point of view a necessary requirement for Europe’s global 
role. Without a serious commitment to further trade liberalisation, Europe is considered 
to be hardly handicapped in competition with the U.S. for a global position. The conti-
nuity of protectionist agricultural policy in Europe is, according to Latin America, in-
compatible with the establishment of strategic alliances. Moreover, words like those of 
Commissioner Franz Fischler, saying that "the multifunctional aspect of the Eus' agri-
cultural policy is not up for negotiation and we have no intention of sacrificing it on the 
altar of free trade”, (IRELA 1999) were interpreted negatively in Latin America. If the 
EU fails in the present decade to fulfil at least partially Latin American expectations, 
the region will definitely not support its global ambitions. 
However, the 54 political, economic and cultural priorities for action listed at the final 
declaration certainly constitute an auspicious begining for building a strategic alliance 
and establishing free trade between both regions. Actions like reinforcing existing insti-
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tutional dialogues between both regions, preserving democracy or protecting human 
rights constitute the framework in the political field. Strengthening the multilateral trade 
system and open regionalism constitutes some of the priorities in the economic field, 
while assigning more resources to address urgent social demands or encouraging 
interregional exchanges between educational actors were some of the main priorities 
in the cultural field. Considering that Europe paid relatively little attention to Latin 
America during the 1980s, setting such ambitious priorities for action and qualifying a 
biregional association as ”strategic” represents a promising change. However, only 
concrete progress in specific negotiations (like those held with Mercosur and Chile) will 
show the real commitment beyond the European rhetoric (see Rubiolo 2000). On the 
contrary, the lack of results at those negotiations is likely to discredit the political aims 
of a partnership and would probably force Latin America into closer cooperation with 
the U.S. for the establishment of an American Free Trade Area. In that context, the 
words of Cardoso are very enlightening: ”Has the EU the conditions to rethink its agri-
cultural problems? If it wants to have a role in the world it must. If it does not want to, 
all is well; we will talk to the USA - with which we get on very well, I stress very well - 
[and] with NAFTA” (Público 1999). 
 
3.3. Final reflections: biregional relations and global governance 
Global changes pose a new range of challenges for Europe as well as Latin America. 
The current international context and the stage achieved by the European integration 
process oblige the EU to establish itself as a single, coherent, political actor at world 
level. Europe’s possibilities for redefining its global position will be increasingly deter-
mined not only by further progress on internal issues but especially by its capability of 
assuming a leading role in the establishment of extraregional partnerships. The scope 
and depth of those partnerships will represent a measure of Europe’s global leader-
ship. A strong commitment to the creation of biregional structures could further repre-
sent a valuable contribution to the assessment of global issues. As regards Latin 
America, its position in the global system is so far not clear. Changes undergone in 
Latin America in the past modified its international role, giving the region more possi-
bilities for participating in the reorganisation of the global system. But processes are 
still ongoing and the outcomes are not certain. A responsible, intelligent management 
of the biregional dialogue could contribute to augmenting Latin America’s weight in the 
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international arena, would reshape positively its position in the world economy and 
would further help strengthen intraregional mechanisms. 
The Summit delineates a first move on both sides to analyse those instruments and 
mechanisms able to represent a contribution to managing globalisation in a shared 
way. It was not only a valuable effort to discuss the present and future of a biregional 
relationship, but also was especially an attempt to define common strategies for grant-
ing both regions an adequate position in the emerging global system through con-
certed action. Regardless of the obvious asymmetry in the relationship, the Summit 
proved that the possibility of discussing common proposals while considering specific 
interests in both regions exists. In that sense, the Summit must be analysed as an an-
swer to the challenges that globalisation has posed for both regions, and the results 
achieved - even if modest - as a milestone for the management of global issues. Al-
though the possibility of achieving concrete decisions at this kind of forum would 
probably remain limited, the institutionalisation of these types of meeting would enable 
certain guidelines to be established for assessing some of the issues impacting at a 
global level. 
The integrated approach applied to Latin America and Europe in the definition of a 
strategic association between both regions made a unique case for analysing the im-
plications of this kind of partnership for the global system. The fact that not only eco-
nomic aspects but also political, cultural and cooperation issues are under discussion 
gives the outcomes of this dialogue a special ”global” relevance. In contrast with other 
biregional dialogues established by Europe (as with Asia), the incorporation of political 
aspects, including actions like the harmonisation of positions at multilateral fora or the 
formulation of common policies, makes a Latin America- Europe partnership a poten-
tially more relevant relationship at the global level. Even if the (more conflicting) eco-
nomic issues seem to outline the scope of the relationship it is definitely the political 
quality of the future partnership that will have the greater impact on the discussion of 
globalisation issues. 
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